“Respect for Nature” (Blog 20)

Paul Taylor gives us our first true glimpse in to an ethic that moves beyond anthropocentrism to what her refers to as a life-centered system of environmental ethics.  “From the perspective of a life-centered theory, we have prima facie moral obligations that are owed to wild plants and animals themselves as members of the Earth’s biotic community.”[1] Taylor argues that the anthropocentric systems of environmental ethics places too much emphasis and importance on sentience as the root of a certain beings moral worth, which makes humans the types of beings to whom all duties are owed. Human-centered ethics has certain interests trespect_naturehat are viewed to be for the good of a being as a necessary component for a being to have a good of its own. But Taylor doesn’t find the two mutually exclusive or necessary; instead, Taylor says, “The good of a population or community of such individuals consists in the population or community maintaining itself from generation to generation as a coherent system of genetically and ecologically related organisms whose average good is at an optimum level for the given environment.”[2] Furthermore, Taylor brings back and expands upon the idea of an Earth community and finds that all moral agents are worth of concern and consideration simply for being a part of this community. In addition, these moral agents have intrinsic value when the realization of their good lead to their prima facie worth. Taylor’s main argument and his ultimate moral attitude in regards to nature is “respect for nature.” He defines this moral attitude as making not just a commitment but, rather, a moral commitment to live a certain kind of life in relation to the natural world.

Taylor makes some very interesting arguments and claims in his essay and they are certainly unique compared to what we have been reading and focusing on in class for the better part of the semester. I personally do believe that plants and animals do have posses their own intrinsic value and pursue their own good in their own unique ways. However, I think it is going to be a very difficult value to ascribe to because in the end, I believe that what we’re all really trying to do is to save the human species not the world or its biological life forms. We have just simply recognized their importance to our own good and are really only prepared to use them as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves. I’ve flirted with this idea in past blogs, but never to this extent. My realization or assertion of this position comes from Taylor’s argument that although humans have the power and responsibility to do the valuing “it is not a value derived form considerations regarding human wellbeing or human rights. It is a value that is ascribed to nonhuman animals and plants themselves, independently of their relationship to respect-nature-Ann-van-den-Broeck1what humans judge to be conducive to their own good.”[3] Most (a lot) of other theories that we’ve covered argue from the position that the only way to save ourselves is to save the planet and its natural biodiversity but once you move outside that human-based way of thinking it’s going to be much more difficult, if not impossible, to motive the human population to enact change. Taylor himself says, “The attitude we take toward living things in the natural world depends on the way we look at them, on what kind of beings we conceive them to be, and on how we understand the relations we bear to them.”[4] This only furthers my point that humans view nature as a means to an end and the actions and relationship that results from this view are detrimental to nature. Furthermore, Taylor talks about saving all life forms not just for aesthetics sake but for respect for nature. Now, as I stated at the beginning of this evaluation, I do find intrinsic and moral value in nature beyond just the beauty that it provides to humans. However, I did find it odd for Taylor to make this argument when Leopold created his famous land ethic based partly on the beauty of nature and biodiversity and even the film that we watched focused on the pristine landscapes and the value of the beauty that needed to be preserved.

Question: Taylor denies human superiority but can we really conceive of a world or an ethic in which this doesn’t exist considering that humans do in fact have the job of doing the valuing?

[1] Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce, The Environmental Ethics & Policy Book (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2003), 202.

[2] VanDeVeer, 202.

[3] VanDeVeer, 205.

[4] VanDeVeer, 206.


Environmental and Land Ethics as the Categorical Imperative (Blog 19)

In his essay, “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair,” J. Baird Callicott draws the distinction between the animal liberation movement and the land ethic theory proposed by Aldo Leopold. Humane moralists (liberationists) really “are atomistic or distributive in their theory of moral value.”[1] This view relies on sentience as the only criteria for judging equal moral value. Whereas, environmental ethics is based on Leopold’s land ethic, which Callicott takes to be the categorical imperative; “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”[2] Critics of Callicott and his use of Leopold’s “maxim” as the categorical imperative of a greater land ethic say that the theory can and will degrade into what has been called “environmental fascism.”[3] However, Callicott refutes this argument by saying that individual rights cannot and will not be outweighed by the aggregative considerations for maximum utility of the biotic community.[4] Callicott also brings in to question the practicality of the animal liberation movement. In practice, if we were to free all of the domestic animals chaos would ensue and there would be a huge loss of species. The movement for P13-0353_9353_blowupanimal liberation comes from the moral repugnance that people feel for what is viewed as inhumane and unnecessary slaughtering of animals, mainly in the practice of factory farming but hunting and scientific research are included in the argument as well. Callicott says that the land ethic challenges this inhumane treatment of animals too but on different grounds. The repugnance for the practices does not originate in the slaughtering itself but rather from the shift from natural to mechanical. Rather than becoming vegetarians, which is the solution put forward by humane moralists, (he says this lifestyle would actually be ecologically catastrophic) we should do as Leopold did and devolve back to being morally appreciative for that which we eat and to get rid of the mechanical process we rely on for our food in exchange for the hunting that our ancestors did or at the very least eating organically.

I think Callicott takes on a lot of interesting arguments in this essay. Though I understand that he does take some criticism for his use of Leopold’s land ethic in a quasi-utilitarian manner, I find it difficult to see where the hole in the argument is found to say that the killing of humans in the name of a sustainable future or the sacrifice of individual animals would be morally acceptable. I find his argument of the practical implications of a total liberation of domestic animals rather convincing. As we discussed in class the argument for liberation would seem paradoxical because it goes together with the requirement to become vegetarians. However, as we said, animals already eat a majority of the crops grown by farmers and if we were to remove meat from our diets and rely on grains, fruits and vegetables it would be rather impractical because we are now in direct competition with the animals that we just liberated for food. Not to mention the fact that most if not all of these domesticated animal species would not be able to survive without human guidance because they are in fact an invention of man. Conservationist and Environmentalist usually go hand in hand with vegetarianism, which is why Leopold was criticized and questioned for his hunting practices. This takes me back to Callicott’s idea of “the transmogrification of organic to mechanical.”[5] The vegetarian/carnivore argument is one that we have had in class on more thavegann one occasion and it is one that I have had with myself a number of times. It seems only fair to say that if you are an environmentalist that you should be against the killing of animals and using them as a means rather than an end. However, I’ve always struggled with this concept because humans are naturally omnivores. Our diet allows for and requires the nutrients that come from both plants and animals and it always seemed odd or unreasonable to me that we as a species should be expected to completely stop eating meat when we would never hold another animal to the same expectation. This seemed odd because we are arguing for their equality and all things being equal if humans have to stop eating meat to create a health sustainable environment then wouldn’t other animals be required to do the same. I know the idea seems absurd but, for me, it’s where the argument for the human species practicing vegetarianism always ends up. In practical terms, it makes no sense for the reasons that Callicott gives. Going back to the idea of the transmogrification of organic to mechanical, I see real merit in this idea. I found it impossible to watch the killing of the animals in factory farms that was shown in the movie we watched in class. But I know that killing for food is natural and necessary for the human species. Therefore, while I know I will be the one purchasing organic rather than killing the animal myself, it also makes sense that the immoral judgment is not in the killing of the animals but rather in the mechanized process that removes the natural aspect that once existed.

Question: Would Regan agree with Callicott’s use of Leopolds Land Ethic as a maxim considering it doesn’t aim to tidy up the system but rather gets to the heart of the problem, which is the shift from natural to mechanical?

[1] J. Baird Callicott, Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair, 249.

[2] Callicott, 241.

[3] Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce, The Environmental Ethics & Policy Book (Belmont,  CA: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2003), 180.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Callicott, 249.

Conflicting Interests and Two Factor Egalitarianism (Blog 18)

In his exploration of interspecific justice, Donald VanDeVeer describes and considers five different principles: Radical Speciesism, Extreme Speciesism, Interest Sensitive Speciesism, Two Factor Egalitarianism and Species Egalitarianism. Radical Speciesism and Extreme Speciesism are, obviously, inherently speciesist. Radical Speicesmism gives no moral weight or intrinsic value to animals. Extreme speciesism is the view that when a moral conflict exists between animal and human-beings the basic interest of animals are overridden by just peripheral interests of humans. Interest Specific Speciesism is the view that basic interests cannot be subordinated by peripheral interests despite whose interests they are (animal or human). Two Factor Egalitarianism “assumes the relevance of two matters: (1) level or importance of interests to each being in a conflict of interests, and (2) the psychological capacities of the parties whose interests conflict.”[1] Finally, Species Egalitarianism is the view that “it is morally permissible… to subordinate the more peripheral to the more basic interest and not otherwise.” [2] VanDeVeer makes the assumption that for the animals who are capable of experiencing suffering we can deduce that “it is in their interest not to suffer.”[3] Furthermore, if it is in their interest not to suffer than it must also be in the interest not to die. It is from these accepted morally relevant interests that he develops the aforementioned principles for resolving conflicts of interests between humans and animals.


First I would like to say that I think VanDeVeer’s work on interspecific justice is extremely important to our class and what we are discussing. We’ve debated whether or not plants or animals have rights but a very specific part of that debate and discussion has been missing up until this point. If we assume that animals do have rights, what are their interests and what happens when their interests conflict with the interests of humans? Of the five principles and theories laid out by VanDeVeer, I found myself most convinced by two-factor egalitarianism. VanDeVeer says, “on TFE the subordination of basic animal interests (say, in living or not suffering) may be subordinated if the animal is (significantly) psychologically “inferior” to the human in Rat-HER_jpegquestion.”[4] I think that this idea appeals to me because, and I’ve madeanimal-testing this point in the past, I feel that there is some sort of proportionality to take in to consideration before we attack certain practices and institutions. For example, useless and even fruitful experimentation on monkeys should stop. These creatures are of higher psychological capacity and they should not be treated like lab rats. However, mice and other small lab animals, maybe rabbits, I believe, don’t have the same moral standing as monkeys and if the testing promotes the more basic interests or to sacrifice the basic interests of those animals with less psychological capacity to promote a serious interest of humans is necessary than I think it’s ok. I really like that “an important general characteristic of TFE is that not any interest of any human morally outweighs any interest of any animal…TFE attempts to take into account both the kind of interests at stake and also psychological traits of the beings in question.”[5] This principle leaves room for case by case situations and proportionality, while at the same time not giving humans the right to use their intellectual and psychological stature to justify every and any unjust action.

Question: Does the classification of basic, peripheral and serious interests leave not only TFE but all of VanDeVeer’s explained principles too vague?

[1] VanDeVeer, 157.

[2] VanDeVeer, 155.

[3] VanDeVeer, 151.

[4] VanDeVeer, 154.

[5] VanDeVeer, 155.

Animal Rights and Inherent Values (Blog 17)

Tom Regan begins his argument for animals rights by denying that simply tidying up what he believes to be unjust institutions (factory farming, commercial and sport hunting and trapping, and the use of animals in scientific research) is not enough because tidying up these institutions does not get at the fundamental wrong. “The fundamental wrong is the system text-ellenthat allows us to view animals as our resources, here for us-to be eaten, or surgically manipulated or put in our cross hairs for sport or money.”[1] Therefore, Regan takes issue not with the details in each case of animal cruelty but rather the system as a whole. Regan then takes us through a few different moral theories that people have tried to apply to the case of animals right but he argue are insufficient or morally wrong. Contractarianism is the theory that individuals agree to and sign a contract of morality by which they judge their actions. This theory gives direct duties to those who have signed the contract and indirect duties to those who have not signed the contract but have some sort of value to those who have. Regan disputes this theory because it is abstract in its idea of who the people are who are signing the contract and leaves the door open for widespread right to life animalsoppression and discrimination. He then introduces the cruelty-kindness view, which is exactly what its name lends it to be; the idea that we should do that which is kind and not do that which is cruel and these are direct duties to animals. But Regan rejects this theory as well, which leads to utilitarianism. Regan explains that the appeal to utilitarianism lies in its egalitarianism, “everyone’s interests are counted and counted equally with the like interests of everyone else.”[2] However, this theory also allows for what was normally be considered unjust actions to be justified in that they brought about the best balance of satisfaction over frustration. Finally, Regan brings us to what he believes is the best animal rights theory. This theory places inherent value in all beings (humans and animals) and any action that curtails those rights would be morally wrong. The principles of this theory is based on the fact that all beings share at least one similarity: “we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life.”[3] Therefore, each of us has to respect that the other possesses inherent value.

            I take issue with Regan and his argument almost immediately. I think the issue arises in the fact that as Regan himself said, he is a philosopher tasked with explaining what we should do and why we should do it but not how we should do it. It is this lack of explaining how we should go about living in his version of moral rightness that makes me feel defensive to his arguments. He starts out by saying, “you don’t change unjust institutions by tiding them up”[4] and the rights theory that he advocates emphasizes an abolitionist approach to the use of animals in science, commercial farming and hunting and trapping animals. Now, at the risk of sounding like an extreme speciesist (which I’m not) I would argue that tiding up these institutions and putting in to place real restrictions and regulations is adequate (in most cases) if these institutions are fundamental to your society. Despite Singer’s wishes, the human population isn’t all of the sudden going to turn around and become vegans and vegetarians. This is where I take issue with Regan; he tells us that what not to do but does not give any answers on how to replace these institutions. Animal testing, and by this I am referring to meaningful animal testing, is extremely important for humans and their future well-being. Commercial farming is necessary to feed the growing human demand for meat and while I do believe that everyone needs to do their part in cutting back their intake of meat and animal products in light of the sustainability issue, both of these institutions are a fundamental part of human well being and to say that we must stop practicing both without offering any suggestions as to how and with what to replace them I just find it extremely hard to fully buy in to Regan’s arguments. I will say though, that in the end I do agree (for the most part, not with the complete abolitionist approach) with Regan’s rights theory. However, in the long road that it took for Regan to get to his idea I also found some agreement in the contractarian theory that was proposed. This is the second time this idea of a contract theory has been brought up. I have mixed feelings about the principles upon which the theory is built. I feel that I agree in some sense that certain duties to certain animals are indirect. However, this idea of a contract of direct duties is rather abstract and, as it was pointed out, assumes that all humans (besides babies and the mentally retarded) are privy to these direct duties provided by the contract, but this is not the case. I think under this theory we’d have to extend direct duties to all humans before we could extend them to animals. This is why I like the idea that the animal rights movement is also a part of the human rights movement. Which, I think may make it a little more relatable and easier for people to see the value in.


            Question: Is Regan’s extension of inherent value to all beings, regardless of whatever differences may exist between those beings, similar or the same as Rawl’s veil of ignorance?

[1] Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce, The Environmental Ethics & Policy Book (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2003), 143.

[2] VanDeVeer, 146.

[3] VanDeVeer, 148.

[4] VanDeVeer, 143.

Animal Cruelty and the Liberation of Nonhumans (Blog 16)

Applied ethicist, Peter Singer, challenges the idea that we have experienced our last liberation movement. The new liberation movement needs to one that liberates nonhumans from this exploitative and slave-like state that husinger quotemans have placed them in. Singer says, “It is a demand for a complete change in our attitudes to nonhumans. It is a demand that we cease to regard the exploitation of other species as natural and inevitable, and that, instead, we see it as a continuing moral outrage.”[1] Singer demonstrates the same argument as Aldo Leopold in saying that we must open up our community and the ethics of that community to include nonhumans. Singer tries to draw the comparison between racism or sexism and speciesism. He rejects the idea that animals other than humans cannot feel pain or that language is a necessary requirement in detecting or expressing this pain. Even people who agree and are disturbed by the details and facts of factory farming are unwilling to consider becoming vegetarians (as Singer argues that humans should be) because they are afraid of changing and don’t want to loose their way of life that they have become so accustomed to.

Singer presents the argument against his idea that humans and nonhumans should be treated equally when he says, “humans and nonhumans obviously are not equal in these respects [intelligence, abilities, etc.]. Since justice demands only that we treat equals equally, unequal treatment of humans and nonhumans cannot be an injustice.”[2] Though Singer criticizes this argument, it is one that got me thinking about whether or not Singer, or even Leopold, considers the idea of proportionality. By this I mean, do they consider the idea that ethics and moral value be given in proportion to the different animals? For example, do we give the same moral weight to a cow or whale that we give to a mouse or an ant? In my opinion, the answer to that question is no. Singer himself admits that it is harder and harder to make the argument of meaningful suffering as you go further animal lawdown the evolutionary scale and get further away from man. Furthermore, Singer ends his article with a weak excuse as to why he didn’t really address situations of moral dilemmas when it comes to animals such as rats. I think that Singer’s argument is one that is going to be hard to digest for most humans because it constantly tries to draw on similarities between different species and humans or “what would you do if the tables were turned” types of situations that I don’t think people will be accepting of. For instance, Singer gives the example of the experiment done on mice that were given electrical shocks in the lab. Though, admittedly, I probably would not be able to watch such an experiment I was not moved very much by it and I certainly could not wrap my head around or agree with the argument that human babies or orphans are less sentient than mice and could therefore be considered test subjects. I also know that this was not exactly the point that Singer was trying to make, but when you make a statement such as the one that he did you have to be able to back it up and I don’t think that he did that very well. I understand and agree with his concept of speciesism; humans cannot keep going at this pace of animal exploitation, it’s not right and it’s unsustainable. However, I still think the question remains of how we are to view all the different types of animals in proportion to the ethics and values we place on them?

Question: Singer talks about the practice of factory farming in terms of its cruelty and ethics but would he ever consider an argument that is based on sustainability?

[1] Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce, The Environmental Ethics & Policy Book (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning, 2003), 135.

[2] VanDeVeer, 136.

Animal Suffering (Blog 15)

The in-class film “Earthlings: Make the Connection” is a gory depiction of the truth behind many of the practices of animal cruelty that humans are either ignorant about or are afraid to face. Animals are used and abused in every aspect; simply from domestication and abandonment to factory farming and circuses. Animals are treated as slaves; unequal to humspay and neuterans and only here to serve us and only when it is convenient for us. One does not even have to get in to the gore of the movie before we see cruelty. At the end of every episode of “The Price is Right” Drew Carey reminds the audience to get their pets spayed and neutered. I never understood why he said that; I just figured it was his own weird catch phrase. However, this movie demonstrates that one of the biggest issues facing domesticated animals, namely dogs and cats, is the owner reluctance to get their pets spayed and neutered, pain and voicewhich leads to the high number of animals that are abandoned and left on the streets to die or are sent to overcrowded shelters where their fate will still probably be death. Furthermore, the cost for the euthanizing drug and the demand for it are so high, the animals will most likely die in an inhumane, painful and drawn out manner. The film also addresses the issue of factory farming. Marketing phrases such as “free range” and “grass fed” are certainly disproved or at the very least tainted in this section of the film. The scene of a factory farm is similar to that of concentration camps during the holocaust, only replacing humans with animals. The biggest way to reduce animal suffering that has been proposed is to reduce our consumption of animal products. This includes both food and the material products made from other parts of the animals.

It’s difficult to face the facts about how we treat animals. I had to keep my head down for the majority of the movie because it was just too painful to watch. In fact, some of my classmates thought that I was sleeping but what I was really doing was listening. Unfortunately, listening wasn’t much better, which too me coincides with Peter Singer’s argument that language is not a necessary requirement for feeling or sensing pain. The “scream” of the cow waiting to be hung and bled out in the factory and the shriek of pigs that were being teased and shot at inside their tiny pen haunt me. The narrator of the film says that if humans were all to look at what they’re doing to these animals that we would realize the error of our ways and we’d probably become vegetarians. I argue that you doncruelty’t even have to watch the bloodbath, just listen to it and it’ll have the same effect. I already eat a very small amount of meat, but that doesn’t ease my concerns of where that meat came from and how it was treated. Like I said before, companies and their marketers prey on the idea that Americans (or just humans in general) have of free open range farms where animals graze and roam until the day that they’re needed. After watching this film I have a very hard time trusting those labels or even understanding how they could be true. But another question also comes to mind: does it matter? Does it matter if a cow is allowed to roam in an open field farm and id fed properly before we kill it for our own use? This question hasn’t really been answered for me yet, either in the film or in this course in general. Does the method matter if we are still treating the animal as a means to an end? I myself am not really sure. Singer seams to advocate for a world filled with vegetarians but I find this hard to imagine. As the biocentrist argument says, humans are hunters and gatherers at heart. Therefore, I don’t see a large shift to vegetarianism any time soon. The Humane Society put out their “Reduce, refine and replace” program, which I think could lend a hand in sending a strong message to producers that consumers do care about where their products are coming from and how they were treated. As I’ve already mentioned, I’m not much of a meat eater myself, but I think I could stand to pay a little more attention to the labels on the packages of animal products that I’m purchasing and while I don’t see myself or a large majority of the population shifting to vegetarianism any time in the near future I do think that the reduce and refine elements of the program are realistic, effective and easy to implement.

Question: Can we have a morally acceptable version of large-scale farming that would sustain the need of humans?

Land Ethics and Environmental Citizenship (Blog 14)

The phrase environmental citizenship seems to take on a few different meaning depending on who is defining the term. The general encyclopedic definition is, “the idea that each of us is an integral part of a larger ecosystem and that our future depends on each of us embracing the challenge and acting responsibly and positively toward our environment.”[1] This definition leaves a lot of room for interpretation. For Aldo Leopold, this interpretation would include opening up our definition of community to include plants, soil and the land in general. His idea of a land ethics views humans as a plain citizen in the world community, with no rights to conquer or to attempt to manipulate nature in a way that he sees best for his needs. However, thinkers such as Sagoff, Dobson and Norton all seem to revert back to a more anthropocentric or human centered approach to environmental citizenship. Their ethics seem to be guided by the idea of stewardship, which in the encyclopedic article is revealed to owe “its prominence in a large measure to the fact that dominion was misinterpreted as domination during translation into most European languages.”[2] The documentary on Aldo Leopold tells the story of his journey that led him to a  wolf 2life dedicated to the health of the environment and improving mankind’s relationship with it. The most influential moment for him was shooting a wolf and then watching the life or what he referred to as the “green fire” leave his eyes. This event shaped his creation of a land ethic and really kick started the environmental movement in a way that had not yet been experienced.

            I think what is most important about the idea of environmental citizenship is that its creation is said to be linked to environmental education. This is an idea that we have discussed many times, the role that children and future generations will play in environmental ethics and policy. The ideas presented in the case for the Children and Nature movement are fundamental to this idea of citizenship. I think that Aldo Leopold discovered his connection to nature at a very young age and was still young when he had his epiphany of thinking like a mountain. As humans, when acting in self interested ways, we normally act on what we think we know, which when it comes to the environment, turns out to be a pretty small amount. But Leopold’s cry for a land ethic and learning from nature by being just another citizen makes a great deal of sense. In thinking like a mountain he says, “I now suspect that just a deer herd lives in mortal fear of its wolves, so does the mountain live in mortal fear of its deer. And perhaps with better cause, for while a buck pulled down by wolves can be replaced in two or three years, a range pulled down by too many deer may fail of replacement in as many decades.”[3] We need to teach our children about the fragility of the environment. When the outcome of a certain environmental policy, for example controlling the population of wolves, differs from the expected outcome, it means that we acted only thinking in terms of human wants and desires without considering the total effects that the action would have on the environment. We need to be as wise as the mountain in understanding the complex relationships that exist in nature. We cannot be stewards if we don’t understand these relationships. Furthermore, I find something uniquely profound in the epiphany that Leopold whaleexperienced when he shot that wolf. For me, this symbolized that as much as we talk about biophilia and this fundamentally and innate desire to be with and to be connected to nature, I think for someone to truly care about cause they too have to come to some sort of profound realization such as the one Leopold himself experienced. I, for example, am not sitting in this environmental ethics class because I had nothing better to do with my time; there is a reason and a purpose for my being here and it’s related to the realization that occurred within myself a few years ago. It may sound silly, but a few years ago there was a popular show called “Whale Wars” which documented this renegade group who were chasing down a Japanese Whaling fleet that was breaking international law and harpooning whales in massive numbers under the guise of scientific research. From the first moment I saw what those ships did the whales I knew that I needed to make it a part of my life’s mission to be able to help those defenseless animals and my interest for all environmental areas of study has grown ever since. I know it may sound idealistic that everyone needs to, or should, or will have a moment of realization that will inspire them to act in a way that Leopold did but I think for any person trying to move beyond stewardship and towards an earth wisdom it would certainly aid the process.

Question: Is Aldo Leopold’s land ethics a form of stewardship or earth wisdom or does it lay somewhere in between?

[1] https://myfiles.fordham.edu/users/evanburen/4302/environmentalcitizenship%5B1%5D.pdf, 323.

[2] Ibid, 324.

[3] https://myfiles.fordham.edu/users/evanburen/4302/del-u.s._environmentalism_since_1945%5B1%5D%283%29.pdf, 74.